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Executive	summary	
Current	fears	over	mistrust	in	journalism	have	deep	roots.	Not	only	has	trust	in	news	media	
been	declining	since	a	high	point	just	after	Watergate,	but	American	trust	in	institutions	of	all	
sorts	is	at	historic	lows.	This	phenomenon	is	present	to	differing	degrees	in	many	advanced	
nations,	suggesting	that	mistrust	in	institutions	is	a	phenomenon	we	need	to	consider	as	a	new	
reality,	not	a	momentary	disruption	of	existing	patterns.	Furthermore,	it	suggests	that	mistrust	
in	media	is	less	a	product	of	recent	technological	and	political	developments,	but	part	of	a	
decades-long	pattern	that	many	advanced	democracies	are	experiencing.	
		
Addressing	mistrust	in	media	requires	that	we	examine	why	mistrust	in	institutions	as	a	whole	
is	rising.	One	possible	explanation	is	that	our	existing	institutions	aren’t	working	well	for	many	
citizens.	Citizens	who	feel	they	can’t	influence	the	governments	that	represent	them	are	less	
likely	to	participate	in	civics.	Some	evidence	exists	that	the	shape	of	civic	participation	in	the	US	
is	changing	shape,	with	young	people	more	focused	on	influencing	institutions	through	markets	
(boycotts,	buycotts	and	socially	responsible	businesses),	code	(technologies	that	make	new	
behaviors	possible,	like	solar	panels	or	electric	cars)	and	norms	(influencing	public	attitudes)	
than	through	law.	By	understanding	and	reporting	on	this	new,	emergent	civics,	journalists	may	
be	able	to	increase	their	relevance	to	contemporary	audiences	alienated	from	traditional	civics.	
		
One	critical	shift	that	social	media	has	helped	accelerate,	though	not	cause,	is	the	
fragmentation	of	a	single,	coherent	public	sphere.	While	scholars	have	been	aware	of	this	
problem	for	decades,	we	seem	to	have	shifted	to	a	more	dramatic	divide,	in	which	people	who	
read	different	media	outlets	may	have	entirely	different	agendas	of	what’s	worth	paying	
attention	to.	It	is	unlikely	that	a	single,	authoritative	entity	–	whether	it	is	mainstream	media	or	
the	presidency	–	will	emerge	to	fill	this	agenda-setting	function.	Instead,	we	face	the	personal	
challenge	of	understanding	what	issues	are	important	for	people	from	different	backgrounds	or	
ideologies.	
		
Addressing	the	current	state	of	mistrust	in	journalism	will	require	addressing	the	broader	crisis	
of	trust	in	institutions.	Given	the	timeline	of	this	crisis,	which	is	unfolding	over	decades,	it	is	
unlikely	that	digital	technologies	are	the	primary	actor	responsible	for	the	surprises	of	the	past	
year.	While	digital	technologies	may	help	us	address	issues,	like	a	disappearing	sense	of	
common	ground,	the	underlying	issues	of	mistrust	likely	require	close	examination	of	the	
changing	nature	of	civics	and	public	attitudes	to	democracy.	
	 	
	
Introduction	
The	presidency	of	Donald	Trump	is	a	confusing	time	for	journalists	and	those	who	see	
journalism	as	an	integral	component	of	a	democratic	and	open	society.		
	
Consider	a	recent	development	in	the	ongoing	feud	between	the	President	and	CNN.	On	July	
2nd,	Donald	Trump	posted	a	28	second	video	clip	to	his	personal	Twitter	account	for	the	
benefit	of	his	33.4	million	followers.1		The	video,	a	clip	from	professional	wrestling	event	
Wrestlemania	232	("The	Battle	of	the	Billionaires"),	shows	Trump	knocking	wrestling	executive	
Vince	McMahon	to	the	ground	and	punching	him	in	the	face.	In	the	video,	McMahon's	face	is	
replaced	with	the	CNN	logo,	and	the	clip	ends	with	an	altered	logo	reading	"FNN:	Fraud	News	
Network".	It	was,	by	far,	Trump's	most	popular	tweet	in	the	past	month,	receiving	587,000	
favorites	and	350,000	retweets,	including	a	retweet	from	the	official	presidential	account.	
	
CNN	responded	to	the	presidential	tweet,	expressing	disappointment	that	the	president	would	
encourage	violence	against	journalists.3		Then	CNN	political	reporter	Andrew	Kaczynski	tracked	
down	Reddit	user	"HanAssholeSolo",	who	posted	the	video	on	the	popular	Reddit	forum,	
The_Donald.	Noting	that	the	Reddit	user	had	apologized	for	the	wrestling	video,	as	well	as	for	a	
long	history	of	racist	and	islamophobic	posts,	and	agreed	not	to	post	this	type	of	content	again,	
Kaczynski	declined	to	identify	the	person	behind	the	account.	Ominously,	he	left	the	door	open:	
"CNN	reserves	the	right	to	publish	his	identity	should	any	of	that	change."	The	possibility	that	
the	video	creator	might	be	identified	enraged	a	group	of	online	Trump	supporters,	who	began	a	
campaign	of	anti-CNN	videos	organized	under	the	hashtag	#CNNBlackmail4,	supported	by	
Wikileaks	founder	Julian	Assange,	who	took	to	Twitter	to	speculate	on	the	crimes	CNN	might	
have	committed	in	their	reportage5.	By	July	6th,	Alex	Jones's	Infowars.com	was	offering	a	
$20,000	prize	in	"The	Great	CNN	Meme	War",	a	competition	to	find	the	best	meme	in	which	
the	President	attacked	and	defeated	CNN.6	
	
It's	not	hard	to	encounter	a	story	like	this	one	and	wonder	what	precisely	has	happened	to	the	
relationship	between	the	press,	the	government	and	the	American	people.	What	does	it	mean	
for	democracy	when	a	sitting	president	refers	to	the	press	as	"the	opposition	party"7?	How	did	
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trust	in	media	drop	so	low	that	attacks	on	a	cable	news	network	serve	some	of	a	politician's	
most	popular	stances?	How	did	"fake	news"	become	the	preferred	epithet	for	reporting	one	
political	party	or	another	disagrees	with?	Where	are	all	these	strange	internet	memes	coming	
from,	and	do	they	represent	a	groundswell	of	political	power?	Or	just	teenagers	playing	a	game	
of	one-upsmanship?	And	is	this	really	what	we	want	major	news	outlets,	including	the	
Washington	Post,	the	New	York	Times	and	CBS,	to	be	covering8910?)	
	
These	are	worthwhile	questions,	and	public	policy	experts,	journalists	and	academics	are	
justified	in	spending	significant	time	understanding	these	topics.	But	given	the	fascinating	and	
disconcerting	details	of	this	wildly	shifting	media	landscape,	it	is	easy	to	miss	the	larger	social	
changes	that	are	redefining	the	civic	role	of	journalism.	I	believe	that	three	shifts	underlie	and	
help	explain	the	confusing	and	challenging	landscape	we	currently	face	and	may	offer	direction	
for	those	who	seek	to	strengthen	the	importance	of	reliable	information	to	an	engaged	
citizenry:	
	
-	The	decline	of	trust	in	journalism	is	part	of	a	larger	collapse	of	trust	in	institutions	of	all	kinds	
-	Low	trust	in	institutions	creates	a	crisis	for	civics,	leaving	citizens	looking	for	new	ways	to	be	
effective	in	influencing	political	and	social	processes	
-	The	search	for	efficacy	is	leading	citizens	into	polarized	media	spaces	that	have	so	little	
overlap	that	shared	consensus	on	basic	civic	facts	is	difficult	to	achieve		
	
I	will	unpack	these	three	shifts	in	turn,	arguing	that	each	has	a	much	deeper	set	of	roots	than	
the	current	political	moment.	These	factors	lead	me	to	a	set	of	question	for	anyone	seeking	to	
strengthen	the	importance	of	reliable	information	in	our	civic	culture.	Because	these	shifts	are	
deeper	than	the	introduction	of	a	single	new	technology	or	the	rise	of	a	specific	political	figure,	
these	questions	focus	less	on	mitigating	the	impact	of	recent	technological	shifts	and	more	on	
either	reversing	these	larger	trends,	or	creating	a	healthier	civic	culture	that	responds	to	these	
changes.	
	
What	happened	to	trust?	
	
Since	1958,	the	National	Election	Study	and	other	pollsters	have	asked	a	sample	of	Americans	
the	following	question:	"Do	you	trust	the	government	in	Washington	to	do	the	right	thing	all	or	
most	of	the	time?"	Trust	peaked	during	the	Johnson	administration	in	1964,	at	77%.	It	declined	
precipitously	under	Nixon,	Ford	and	Carter,	recovered	somewhat	under	Reagan,	and	nose-
dived	under	George	HW	Bush.	Trust	rose	through	Clinton's	presidency	and	peaked	just	after	
George	W.	Bush	led	the	country	into	war	in	Iraq	and	Afghanistan,	collapsing	throughout	his	
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presidency	to	the	sub-25%	levels	that	characterized	Obama's	years	in	office.	Between	Johnson	
and	Obama,	American	attitudes	towards	Washington	reversed	themselves	-	in	the	mid	1960s,	it	
was	as	difficult	to	find	someone	with	low	trust	in	the	federal	government	as	it	is	difficult	today	
to	find	someone	who	deeply	trusts	the	government.11	
	
	
	
Declining	trust	in	government,	especially	in	Congress	-	the	least	trusted	branch	of	our	tripartite	
system	-	is	an	old	story,	and	generations	of	politicians	have	run	against	Washington,	taking	
advantage	of	the	tendency	for	Americans	to	re-elect	their	representatives	while	condemning	
Congress	as	a	whole.	What's	more	surprising	is	the	slide	in	confidence	in	institutions	of	all	sorts.	
Trust	in	public	schools	has	dropped	from	62%	in	1975	to	31%	now,	while	confidence	in	the	
medical	system	has	fallen	from	80%	to	37%	in	the	same	time	period.	We	see	significant	
decreases	in	confidence	in	organized	religion,	banks,	organized	labor,	the	criminal	justice	
system	and	in	big	business.	The	only	institutions	that	have	increased	in	trust	in	Gallup's	surveys	
are	the	military,	which	faced	Vietnam-era	skepticism	when	Gallup	began	its	questioning,	and	
small	business,	which	is	less	a	conventional	institution	than	the	invitation	to	imagine	an	
individual	businessperson.	With	the	exception	of	the	military,	Americans	show	themselves	to	
be	increasingly	skeptical	of	large	or	bureaucratic	institutions,	from	courts	to	churches.12	
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American	media	institutions	have	experienced	the	same	decades-long	fall	in	trust.	Newspapers	
were	trusted	by	51%	of	American	survey	respondents	in	1979,	compared	to	20%	in	2016.	Trust	
in	broadcast	television	peaked	at	46%	in	1993	and	now	sits	at	21%.	Trust	in	mass	media	as	a	
whole	peaked	at	72%	in	1976,	in	the	wake	of	the	press's	role	in	exposing	the	Watergate	
scandal.	Four	decades	later,	that	figure	is	now	32%,	less	than	half	of	its	peak.	And	while	
Republicans	now	show	a	very	sharp	drop	in	trust	in	mainstream	media	-	from	32%	in	2015	to	
14%	in	2016,	trust	in	mass	media	has	dropped	steadily	for	Democrats	and	independents	as	
well.13	
	
In	other	words,	the	internet	and	social	media	has	not	destroyed	trust	in	media	-	trust	was	
dropping	even	before	cable	TV	became	popular.	Nor	is	the	internet	becoming	a	more	trusted	
medium	than	newspapers	or	television	-	in	2014,	19%	of	survey	respondents	said	they	put	a	
great	deal	of	trust	in	internet	news.	Instead,	trust	in	media	has	fallen	steadily	since	the	1980s	
and	1990s,	now	resting	at	roughly	half	the	level	it	enjoyed	30	years	ago,	much	like	other	
indicators	of	American	trust	in	institutions.	
	
It's	not	only	Americans	who	are	skeptical	of	institutions,	and	of	media	in	particular.	Edelman,	a	
US-based	PR	firm,	conducts	an	annual,	global	survey	of	trust	called	Eurobarometer,	which	
compares	levels	of	trust	in	institutions	similar	to	those	Gallup	asks	about.14	The	2017	
Eurobarometer	survey	identifies	the	US	as	"neutral",	between	a	small	number	of	high	trust	
countries	and	a	large	set	of	mistrustful	countries.	(Only	one	of	the	five	countries	Eurobarometer	
lists	as	highly	trusting	are	open	societies,	rated	as	"free"	by	Freedom	House:	India.	The	other	
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four	-	China,	Indonesia,	Singapore	and	the	United	Arab	Emirates,	are	partly	free	or	not	free.15	
Depressingly,	there	is	a	discernable,	if	weak,	correlation	between	more	open	societies	and	low	
scores	on	Edelman's	trust	metric.16)	As	in	the	US,	trust	in	media	plumbed	new	depths	in	
Eurobarometer	countries,	reaching	all	time	lows	in	17	of	the	28	countries	surveyed	and	leaving	
media	contending	with	government	as	the	least	trusted	set	of	institutions	(business	and	NGOs	
rate	significantly	higher,	though	trust	in	all	institutions	is	dropping	year	on	year.)		
	
So	what	happened	to	trust?	
	
By	recognizing	that	the	decrease	in	trust	in	media	is	part	of	a	larger	trend	of	reduced	trust	in	
institutions,	and	understanding	that	shift	as	a	trend	that's	unfolded	over	at	least	4	decades,	we	
can	dismiss	some	overly	simplistic	explanations	for	the	current	moment.	The	decline	of	trust	in	
journalism	precedes	Donald	Trump.	While	it's	likely	that	trust	in	media	will	fall	farther	under	a	
government	that	presents	journalists	as	the	opposition	party,	Trump's	choice	of	the	press	as	
enemy	is	shrewd	recognition	of	a	trend	already	underway.	Similarly,	we	can	reject	the	facile	
argument	that	the	internet	has	destroyed	trust	in	media	and	other	institutions.	Even	if	we	date	
broad	public	influence	of	the	internet	to	2000,	when	only	52%	of	the	US	population	was	
online17,	the	decline	in	trust	in	journalism	began	at	least	20	years	earlier.	If	we	accept	the	
current	moment	as	part	of	a	larger	trend,	we	need	a	more	systemic	explanation	for	the	collapse	
of	trust.	
	
Scholars	have	studied	interpersonal	trust	-	the	question	of	how	much	you	can	trust	other	
individuals	in	society	-	for	decades,	finding	robust	evidence	of	a	correlation	between	
interpersonal	trust	at	a	societal	level	and	economic	success18.	The	relationship	between	
interpersonal	trust	and	trust	in	institutions	is	less	clear:	Sweden,	for	instance,	is	one	of	the	
world	leaders	in	interpersonal	trust,	but	one	of	the	most	mistrustful	of	governments	and	other	
institutions.	Comparing	the	2014	World	Values	Survey	measure	of	interpersonal	trust	to	the	
2017	Eurobarometer	survey	of	institutional	trust	shows	no	correlation19.	So	while	interpersonal	
trust	has	dropped	sharply	in	the	US	(from	48%	in	1984	to	31%	in	2014,	using	data	from	the	
General	Social	Survey,	the	broader	world	shows	fairly	stable	interpersonal	trust.	Yet	a	decrease	
of	trust	in	institutions	is	widespread	globally,	as	seen	both	in	the	Eurobarometer	data	and	in	
Gallup	OECD	data.20	It's	not	just	that	we	trust	each	other	less	-	people	around	the	world	appear	
to	trust	institutions	less.	
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It's	also	possible	that	reduced	confidence	in	institutions	could	relate	to	economic	stress.	As	
numerous	scholars,	notably	Thomas	Piketty,	have	observed,	economic	inequality	is	reaching	
heights	in	the	US	not	seen	since	the	Gilded	Age.	The	decrease	of	confidence	in	institutions	
roughly	correlates	with	the	increase	Piketty	sees	in	inequality,	which	is	stable	through	the	50's,	
60's	and	mid-70's,	rising	sharply	from	there.21		
	
	
	
We	might	think	of	an	explanation	in	which	citizens,	frustrated	by	their	decreasing	share	of	the	
pie,	punish	the	societal	institutions	responsible	for	their	plight.	But	with	this	explanation,	we	
would	expect	to	see	rising	inequality	accompanied	by	a	steady	drop	in	consumer	confidence.	
We	don't	-	consumer	confidence	in	the	US	and	in	the	OECD	more	broadly	is	roughly	as	high	now	
as	it	was	in	the	1960s,	despite	sharp	drops	during	moments	of	economic	stress	and	a	rise	during	
the	"long	boom"	of	the	'90s	and	2000s.	It's	possible	that	citizens	should	be	punishing	
governments,	banks	and	businesses	for	rising	inequality,	but	consumer	behavior	and	
confidence	doesn't	corroborate	the	story.22		
	
I	favor	a	third	theory,	put	forward	by	Kenneth	Newton	and	Pippa	Norris,	called	the	institutional	
performance	model.	Simply	put,	when	institutions	perform	poorly,	people	lose	trust	in	them:	"It	
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is	primarily	governmental	performance	that	determines	the	level	of	citizens’	confidence	in	
public	institutions."23	That	trust	in	institutions,	easily	lost,	takes	a	long	time	to	regain.	We	might	
understand	the	collapse	of	confidence	in	US	institutions	as	a	set	of	high	visibility	crises:	Vietnam	
and	Watergate	as	eroding	confidence	in	the	federal	government,	the	Catholic	Church	sex	
scandal	destroying	trust	in	that	institution,	the	2007	financial	collapse	damaging	faith	in	banks	
and	big	business.	
	
Newton	and	Norris	developed	their	theories	in	the	mid-1990s,	noting	that	confidence	in	public	
institutions	was	plumbing	new	depths.	In	retrospect,	their	concerns	seem	well-founded,	as	the	
trends	they	observed	have	simply	increased	over	time.	In	the	mid	1990s,	Newton	and	Norris	
were	comfortable	positing	a	relationship	between	society-wide	interpersonal	trust	and	trust	in	
institutions	-	that	relationship	is	less	clear	now,	because	interpersonal	trust	has	remained	fairly	
constant	while	trust	in	institutions	has	decreased.	One	explanation	for	the	decrease	in	
institutional	trust	is	that	institutions	have	performed	poorly,	and	that	citizens	are	increasingly	
aware	of	their	shortcomings.	
	
Cultural	and	technological	shifts	may	have	made	it	easier	for	institutions	to	lose	trust	and	
harder	to	regain	it.	Watergate	returned	the	US	press	to	its	progressive-era	muckraking	roots	
and	ended	a	period	of	deference	in	which	indiscretions	by	figures	of	authority	were	sometimes	
ignored.	(It's	interesting	to	imagine	the	Clinton-era	press	covering	JFK's	personal	life.)	An	
explosion	in	news	availability,	through	cable	television's	24-hour	news	cycle	and	the	internet,	
has	ensured	a	steady	stream	of	negative	news,	which	engages	audiences	through	fear	and	
outrage.	The	rise	of	social	media	fuels	the	fire,	allowing	individuals	to	report	institutional	
failures	(police	shootings,	for	example)	and	spread	their	dismay	to	friends	and	broader	
audiences.	Accompanying	the	evolution	of	media	technologies	is	education:	in	1971,	12%	of	
Americans	had	graduated	from	college,	and	57%	from	high	school.	By	2012,	31%	had	college	
degrees,	and	88%	had	high	school	diplomas.	The	citizens	of	2017	are	better	positioned	to	be	
critical	of	institutions	than	those	of	1964.24	
	
If	we	accept	any	of	these	explanations	for	a	decrease	in	trust	in	institutions,	the	obvious	
question	emerges:	How	do	we	reverse	this	trend?	How	do	we	restore	public	trust?		
	
It's	worth	noting	that	those	most	concerned	with	restoring	public	trust	tend	to	be	elites,	those	
for	whom	existing	institutions	are	often	working	quite	well.	Eurobarometer's	2017	report	
focuses	on	a	widening	trust	gap	between	a	well-informed	15%	of	the	population	and	a	less	
informed	85%.	The	well-informed	minority	scores	60	on	Edelman's	trust	index,	while	the	less-
informed	majority	is	15	points	lower,	at	45.	The	gap	between	elites	and	the	majority	is	largest	
in	the	US	-	22	points	separate	the	groups.25			
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One	approach	to	institutional	mistrust	is	to	try	and	educate	this	disenchanted	majority,	helping	
them	understand	why	our	institutions	are	not	as	broken	as	we	sometimes	imagine.	Any	
approach	is	unlikely	to	reach	all	citizens	-	some	will	remain	frustrated	and	alienated,	due	to	
disinterest,	misinformation,	a	healthy	distaste	for	being	told	what	to	think,	or	due	to	the	fact	
that	their	mistrust	may	be	justified.	
	
TV	commentator	Chris	Hayes	encourages	us	to	recognize	that	those	frustrated	with	institutions	
constitute	a	large	and	powerful	segment	of	society26.	He	suggests	that	dividing	Americans	into	
institutionalists,	who	want	to	strengthen	and	preserve	our	existing	social	institutions,	and	
insurrectionists,	who	see	a	need	to	overhaul,	overthrow,	replace	or	abandon	existing	
institutions,	is	at	least	as	useful	as	dividing	the	population	into	liberals	and	conservatives.	
Insurrectionists	include	progressives	(Bernie	Sanders),	libertarians	(Rand	Paul)	and	nationalists	
(Donald	Trump),	while	both	Republicans	and	Democrats	are	well	represented	within	the	
institutionalist	camp.		
	
The	defeat	of	a	consummate	institutionalist	-	Hillary	Clinton	-	by	an	insurrectionist	outsider	
suggests	a	need	to	take	rising	insurrectionism	seriously.	What	if	our	citizens	now	include	a	large	
plurality	unlikely	to	be	persuaded	to	regain	trust	in	our	central	civic	institutions?	
	
How	mistrust	reshapes	civics	
	
Assume	for	the	moment	that	a	large	group	of	citizens	is	mistrustful	of	existing	institutions.	How	
do	these	citizens	participate	in	civic	life?		
	
Low	participation	in	congressional	elections	is	often	offered	as	evidence	of	the	decline	in	
American	civic	life.	But	in	2012,	only	35	of	435	congressional	seats	were	considered	"swing"	
districts,	where	voting	margins	were	within	5%	of	the	national	popular	vote	margin	-	the	
remaining	92%	of	districts	strongly	favor	either	a	sitting	Democrat	or	Republican.27	The	safety	of	
these	districts	leads	to	an	extremely	high	rate	of	incumbent	re-election,	95.9%.28	Combine	the	
very	low	chance	of	making	a	difference	in	a	Congressional	election	with	extremely	low	trust	in	
Congress	(9%	in	201629)	and	it's	easy	to	understand	why	many	citizens	-	including	some	
institutionalists	-	would	sit	an	election	out.	
	
When	we	teach	young	people	how	to	have	a	civic	voice,	we	tend	to	emphasize	the	importance	
of	voting	as	a	baseline	civic	responsibility	-	as	the	bumper	sticker	says,	"If	you	don't	vote,	you	
can't	complain."	But	at	high	levels	of	mistrust,	voting	doesn't	work	very	well.	If	we	see	
Congress,	the	Senate	or	the	presidency	as	dysfunctional	institutions,	either	unlikely	to	
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accomplish	much30	or	to	represent	our	interests,	voting	for	representatives	or	encouraging	
them	to	advance	or	support	legislation	doesn't	feel	like	a	powerful	way	to	influence	civic	
processes.	
	
High	levels	of	mistrust	present	a	challenge	for	protest	as	well.	Unless	the	goal	of	a	protest	-	a	
march,	a	sit-in,	an	occupation	-	is	the	fall	of	a	regime	(as	it	was	with	the	protests	of	the	Arab	
Spring),	then	a	protest	is	designed	to	show	widespread	support	for	a	political	position	and	
influence	leaders.	The	March	on	Washington,	likely	the	most	remembered	event	of	the	civil	
rights	movement	as	it	culminated	in	Martin	Luther	King	Jr.'s	"I	Have	a	Dream"	speech,	was,	
after	all,	a	march	on	Washington.	It	sought	to	pressure	President	Kennedy	and	Congress	to	take	
action	on	civil	rights	legislation	and	is	credited	with	creating	the	momentum	for	LBJ	to	act	
quickly	on	civil	rights	after	Kennedy's	assassination.	
	
What	happens	when	protesters	no	longer	trust	that	institutions	they	might	influence	can	make	
necessary	social	changes?	The	Occupy	movement	was	widely	criticized	for	failing	to	put	forward	
a	legislative	agenda	that	representatives	could	choose	to	pass.31	Occupiers,	in	part,	were	
expressing	their	lack	of	confidence	in	the	federal	government	and	didn't	put	forth	these	
proposals	because	their	goal	was	to	demonstrate	other	forms	of	community	decision-making.	
Whether	or	not	Occupy	succeeded	in	demonstrating	the	viability	of	consensus-based	
governance,	the	resistance	of	Occupiers	to	turning	into	a	political	party	or	advocacy	
organization	shows	a	deep	insurrectionist	distrust	of	existing	institutions	and	an	unwillingness	
to	operate	within	them.	
	
The	danger	is	that	insurrectionists	will	drop	out	of	civic	life	altogether,	or	be	manipulated	by	
demagogues	who	promise	to	obviate	the	complexities	of	mistrusted	institutions	through	the	
force	of	their	personal	character	and	will.	The	hope	is	that	insurrectionists	can	become	
powerful,	engaged	citizens	who	participate	in	civic	life	despite	their	skepticism	of	existing	
institutions.	To	make	this	possible,	we	need	to	broaden	our	understanding	of	what	it	means	to	
be	a	good	citizen.		
	
There	is	a	tendency	to	assume	that	the	actions	that	constitute	good	citizenship	are	stable	over	
time.	Good	citizens	inform	themselves	about	issues,	vote	in	elections,	contact	representatives	
about	issues	they	care	about	and,	if	they	fail	to	be	heard,	protest	peacefully	and	non-violently.	
Michael	Schudson	argues	that	this	model	of	citizenship	is	only	one	of	several	that	has	held	sway	
in	the	US	at	different	moments	in	our	nation's	history.	Early	in	the	American	republic,	"good	
citizens"	would	be	expected	to	send	the	most	prominent	and	wealthy	member	of	their	
community	to	Washington	to	represent	them,	independent	of	agreement	with	his	ideology.	
Later,	good	citizens	supported	a	political	party	they	affiliated	with	based	on	geography,	
ethnicity	or	occupation.	The	expectation	that	voters	would	inform	themselves	on	issues	before	
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voting,	vote	on	split	tickets	making	decisions	about	individual	candidates	or	vote	directly	on	
legislation	in	a	referendum	was	the	result	of	a	set	of	progressive	era	reforms	that	ushered	in	
what	Schudson	calls	"the	informed	citizen".32	
	
We	tend	to	see	the	informed	citizen	as	the	correct	and	admirable	model	for	citizenship	a	
hundred	years	after	its	introduction,	but	we	miss	some	of	the	weaknesses	of	the	paradigm.	
Informed	citizenship	places	very	high	demands	on	citizens,	expecting	knowledge	about	all	the	
candidates	and	issues	at	stake	in	an	election	-	it's	a	paradigm	deeply	favored	by	journalists,	as	it	
places	the	role	of	the	news	as	informing	and	empowering	citizens	at	the	center	of	the	political	
process.	Unfortunately,	it's	also	a	model	plagued	with	very	low	participation	rates	-	Schudson	
observes	that	the	voting	was	cut	nearly	in	half	once	progressive	political	reforms	came	into	
effect.	And	while	we	often	discuss	civics	and	participation	in	terms	of	the	informed	citizen	
mode,	he	argues	that	America	has	moved	on	to	other	dominant	models	of	citizenship,	the	
rights-based	citizenship	model	that	centers	on	the	courts,	as	during	the	civil	rights	movement,	
and	monitorial	citizenship,	where	citizens	realize	they	cannot	follow	all	the	details	of	all	political	
processes	and	monitor	media	for	a	few,	specific	issues	where	they	are	especially	passionate	and	
feel	well-positioned	to	take	action.	
	
Young	people	in	particular	are	looking	for	ways	they	can	be	most	effective	in	making	change	
around	issues	they	care	about.	Effective	citizenship,	in	which	individuals	make	rational,	self-
interested	decisions	about	how	they	most	effectively	participate	in	civic	life,	can	look	very	
different	from	the	informed	citizenship	we've	come	to	expect.	Joe	Kahne	and	Cathy	Cohen	
surveyed	thousands	of	youth	in	California	and	discovered	that	while	participation	in	
"institutional"	politics	(rallies,	traditional	political	organizing,	volunteering	to	work	with	a	
candidate)	is	low,	there	is	strong	engagement	with	"participatory	politics",	sharing	civic	
information	online,	discussing	social	issues	in	online	fora,	making	and	sharing	civic	media.33	And	
while	young	people	may	not	be	volunteering	for	political	campaigns,	they	are	volunteering	at	a	
much	higher	rate	than	previous	generations,	looking	for	direct,	tangible	ways	they	can	
participate	in	their	communities.34	
	
We	are	beginning	to	see	new	forms	of	civic	participation	that	appeal	to	those	alienated	from	
traditional	political	processes.	One	way	to	understand	these	methods	is	as	levers	of	change.	
When	people	feel	like	they	are	unlikely	to	move	formal,	institutional	levers	of	change	through	
voting	or	influencing	representatives,	they	look	for	other	levers	to	make	movement	on	the	
issues	they	care	about.	
	
In	his	1999	book,	Code	and	Other	Laws	of	Cyberspace35,	Lawrence	Lessig	argues	that	there	are	
four	primary	ways	societies	regulate	themselves.	We	use	laws	to	make	behaviors	legal	or	illegal.	
We	use	markets	to	make	desirable	behaviors	cheap	and	dangerous	ones	expensive.	We	use	
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social	norms	to	sanction	undesirable	behaviors	and	reward	exemplary	ones.	And	code	and	
other	technical	architectures	make	undesirable	actions	difficult	to	do	and	encourage	other	
actions.	Each	of	the	regulatory	forces	Lessig	identifies	can	be	turned	into	a	lever	of	change,	and	
in	an	age	of	high	mistrust	in	institutions,	engaged	citizens	are	getting	deeply	creative	in	using	
the	three	non-legal	levers.	
	
In	the	wake	of	Edward	Snowden's	revelations	of	widespread	NSA	surveillance	of	
communications,	many	citizens	expressed	fear	and	frustration.	The	Obama	administration's	
review	of	the	NSA's	programs	made	few	significant	changes	to	domestic	spying	policies.3637	
Unable	to	make	change	through	formal	government	processes,	digital	activists	have	been	hard	
at	work	building	powerful,	user-friendly	tools	to	encrypt	digital	communications	like	Signal,	
whose	powerful	encryption	has	now	been	incorporated	into	the	widely	used	WhatsApp	
platform.38	Code-based	theories	of	change	allow	programmers	and	engineers	to	become	
powerful	social	change	actors,	making	new	behaviors	possible,	whether	they	increase	personal	
privacy	or	reduce	dependency	on	fossil	fuels.	
	
Market-based	theories	of	change	use	capitalism's	capacity	for	scaling	to	change	the	behavior	of	
large	groups	of	people.	We	usually	think	of	Elon	Musk	as	an	inventive	entrepreneur	and	
engineer,	but	it's	also	possible	to	think	of	him	as	one	of	the	most	effective	activists	working	to	
halt	climate	change.	By	building	a	highly	desirable	electric	car	and	the	infrastructure	to	charge	it	
at	home	and	on	the	road,	Musk	may	ultimately	reduce	carbon	emissions	as	much	as	legislating	
global	carbon	markets.	Market-based	activists	use	boycotts,	buycotts	and	social	ventures	to	
encourage	consumers	to	make	change	using	their	wallets,	a	technique	used	since	American	
colonists	eschewed	heavily	taxed	British	goods,	now	organized	and	accelerated	through	
communications	networks.	
	
If	code-based	theories	of	change	are	most	open	to	engineers	and	market	levers	to	
entrepreneurs,	norms-based	theories	of	change	have	been	embraced	by	those	who	make	and	
disseminate	media...	which	in	the	age	of	social	networks	includes	the	majority	of	Americans	and	
the	vast	majority	of	young	Americans.	The	Black	Lives	Matter	movement	is	less	focused	on	
specific	legislative	change	than	on	changing	social	norms	that	cause	many	people	to	see	black	
males,	especially	young	black	males,	as	a	threat.	Laws	are	already	on	the	books	that	should	
protect	black	males	from	police	violence.	But	when	a	policeman	perceives	12-year	old	Tamir	
Rice	as	a	threat	because	he	is	a	young	black	man	playing	with	a	toy,	changing	the	norms	of	how	
African	Americans	are	seen	by	police	-	and	by	society	as	a	whole	-	is	a	high	priority.	Online,	BLM	
protesters	have	focused	on	making	unarmed	deaths	at	the	hands	of	the	police	highly	visible,	
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leading	to	a	surge	of	media	coverage	in	the	wake	of	Michael	Brown's	death,	making	these	
incidents	at	least	10	times	as	visible	as	they	were	before	the	Ferguson	protests.39	
	
Effective	citizenship	means	that	people	look	for	the	methods	of	social	change	they	see	as	most	
effective.	Young	people	often	look	for	norms-based	theories	of	change,	taking	advantage	of	
their	skills	in	building	and	disseminating	media.	Insurrectionists	frustrated	with	legal	institutions	
or	with	the	behaviors	of	corporate	America	look	for	change	through	new	technology	and	new	
ventures.		
	
This	shift	in	citizenship	is	still	emerging.	Media	often	hasn't	caught	up	with	the	idea	that	
effective	civic	engagement	happens	outside	the	courts,	the	voting	booth	and	Congress.	This	
understandable	overfocus	on	law-based	theories	of	change	leaves	those	frustrated	with	
institutions	frustrated	with	media	as	well.	For	insurrectionists	who	see	Washington	institutions	
as	ineffective	and	untrustworthy,	a	strong	media	focus	on	these	institutions	can	look	like	an	
attempt	to	maintain	their	legitimacy	and	centrality.	
	
One	of	journalism's	key	roles	in	an	open	society	is	to	help	citizens	participate	effectively.	From	
close	scrutiny	of	those	in	elected	office	to	analysis	of	legislative	proposals	to	editorial	
endorsements	of	candidates	for	office,	news	outlets	help	their	customers	make	civic	decisions.	
If	mistrust	in	institutions	is	changing	how	people	participate	in	civics,	news	organizations	may	
need	to	change	as	well.	We	can	recommit	ourselves	to	explaining	the	importance	and	centrality	
of	our	institutions,	but	we	run	the	risk	of	being	insufficiently	skeptical	and	critical,	and	the	
danger	that	we	lose	even	more	trust	from	our	alienated	and	insurrectionist	readers.	Or	we	
could	rethink	our	role	as	journalists	as	helping	people	navigate	this	emergent	civic	landscape	
and	find	the	places	where	they,	individually	and	collectively,	can	be	the	most	effective	and	
powerful.	
	
Dueling	spheres	of	consensus	
	
Shortly	after	the	2016	elections,	a	friend	asked	me	to	lunch.	A	Trump	supporter,	he	knew	we	
had	voted	differently	in	the	election,	and	we	both	wanted	to	talk	about	the	future	of	the	
country	under	the	new	administration.	But	he	invited	me	specifically	because	he	was	angered	
by	an	article	I'd	written	that	grouped	Breitbart	founder	Steve	Bannon	with	alt-right	leader	
Richard	Spencer.40		
	
My	friend	explained	that	he	read	Breitbart	religiously,	not	because	he	supports	white	
supremacy,	but	because	he	supports	net-zero	immigration	to	the	US	as	a	strategy	for	raising	the	
incomes	of	white	and	non-white	Americans.	Breitbart	was	the	only	major	media	outlet	he	
found	seriously	discussing	that	policy	stance.	"If	Bannon	is	beyond	the	pale,	and	Breitbart's	
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beyond	the	pale,	does	it	mean	that	my	views	on	immigration	are	beyond	the	pale?	And	what	
about	the	millions	of	Americans	who	agree	with	me?"41		
	
Research	I	conducted	with	Yochai	Benkler	and	our	team	confirmed	my	friend's	assertion	that	
Breitbart	covered	matters	of	immigration	much	more	closely	than	other	media	outlets	leading	
up	to	the	2016	election,	focusing	on	the	issue	more	than	3x	as	often	as	right-leaning	outlets	Fox	
News	and	the	Wall	Street	Journal.42		Thanks	to	the	strong	influence	of	Breitbart,	we	speculate,	
immigration	became	the	most-reported	on	policy	issue	in	the	2016	election,	despite	GOP	
efforts	to	soften	the	party's	stance	on	immigration	to	reach	Latino	voters.43	
	
The	move	of	immigration	from	the	fringe	of	the	news	agenda	to	a	central	topic	is	a	
phenomenon	addressed	by	media	scholar	Daniel	Hallin	in	his	1986	book,	The	Uncensored	War:	
The	Media	and	Vietnam.44	Hallin	argues	that	we	should	think	of	potential	news	stories	as	fitting	
into	one	of	three	spheres.	In	the	sphere	of	consensus,	there	is	widespread	agreement	on	an	
issue	or	a	position	(democracy	is	the	best	form	of	government;	capitalism	is	a	good	way	to	build	
an	economy)	and	therefore	it's	not	worth	our	time	to	discuss.	In	the	sphere	of	deviance,	there	
is	widespread	agreement	that	a	stance	is	beyond	the	pale	(sexual	relationships	between	adults	
and	minors	are	natural	and	should	be	legal;	collective	ownership	of	all	goods	is	the	best	way	to	
end	economic	inequality)	and	also	not	worthy	of	discussion.	The	(sometimes	very	narrow)	
sphere	of	legitimate	controversy	includes	the	standard	political	debates	within	a	society,	and	
journalists	are	expected	to	show	themselves	as	neutral	on	those	topics	legitimate	to	debate	
(tax	cuts	for	the	wealthy	will	lead	to	economic	growth;	for-profit	insurers	will	only	survive	with	
federally	mandated	medical	insurance).	
	
Lobbyists,	activists	and	PR	professionals	have	used	Hallin's	spheres	to	shape	what's	at	stake	in	
public	policy	debates.	Health	insurance	companies	have	worked	hard	to	push	the	idea	of	single	
payer	healthcare	into	the	sphere	of	deviance,	rebranding	the	idea	as	socialized	medicine	to	
associate	it	with	a	disfavored	economic	idea.45	By	citing	the	small	number	of	scientists	who	do	
not	see	evidence	that	humans	are	contributing	to	climate	change,	advocates	have	kept	the	
phenomenon	of	global	warming	within	the	sphere	of	legitimate	debate.		
	
While	Hallin's	Spheres	are	related	to	the	Overton	window	-	the	idea	that	certain	policy	
prescriptions	are	so	radical	that	a	politician	could	not	embrace	them	without	compromising	her	
own	electability46	-	being	consigned	to	Hallin's	sphere	of	deviance	has	psychological	
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implications	that	falling	outside	the	Overton	window	lacks.	Advance	a	policy	suggestion	that	is	
outside	the	Overton	window	and	you	suffer	the	disappointment	that	your	idea	is	discarded	as	
impractical.	Stray	outside	the	sphere	of	legitimate	debate	into	the	sphere	of	deviance,	and	your	
position	becomes	invisible	to	mainstream	media	dialog.	Journalism	scholar	Jay	Rosen	observes,	
"Anyone	whose	views	lie	within	the	sphere	of	deviance	—	as	defined	by	journalists	—	will	
experience	the	press	as	an	opponent	in	the	struggle	for	recognition.	If	you	don’t	think	
separation	of	church	and	state	is	such	a	good	idea;	if	you	do	think	a	single	payer	system	is	the	
way	to	go...	chances	are	you	will	never	find	your	views	reflected	in	the	news.	It's	not	that	
there’s	a	one-sided	debate;	there's	no	debate."47	
	
The	growth	in	media	diversity	brought	about	by	the	rise	of	the	internet	and	social	media	means	
that	if	your	ideas	are	outside	the	sphere	of	legitimate	debate,	you	can	simply	find	a	media	
sphere	where	you're	no	longer	in	the	sphere	of	deviance.	My	friend,	frustrated	that	he	could	
not	find	media	debating	his	ideas	on	immigration,	began	reading	Breitbart,	where	his	deviant	
ideas	are	within	the	sphere	of	consensus,	and	the	legitimate	debate	is	about	the	specific	
mechanisms	that	should	be	used	to	limit	immigration.	He	is	not	alone.	While	less	popular	than	
during	the	2016	election,	Breitbart	is	the	61st	most	popular	website	in	the	US48,	close	in	
popularity	to	the	Washington	Post.	In	our	data	set,	which	examines	how	websites	are	shared	on	
Twitter	or	Facebook,	Breitbart	is	the	fourth-most	influential	media	outlet,	behind	CNN,	The	
New	York	Times	and	politics	site	The	Hill.	
	
The	ability	to	find	a	set	of	media	outlets	compatible	with	your	political	views	is	not	new.	Even	in	
the	days	of	political	pamphlets	and	early	newspapers,	it	was	possible	to	experience	a	Federalist	
or	Anti-Federalist	echo	chamber.	The	rise	of	large-circulation	newspapers	and	broadcast	media,	
which	needed	to	avoid	alienating	large	swaths	of	the	population	to	maintain	fiscal	viability,	led	
us	into	a	long	age	where	partisan	journalism	was	less	common.49		Even	as	cable	news	made	
partisan	news	viable	again,	broadcast	news	networks	and	major	newspapers	maintained	
aspirations	of	fairness	and	balance,	attempting	to	serve	the	broader	public.	
	
Those	economic	models	make	little	sense	in	a	digital	age.	As	purveyors	of	wholly	manufactured	
fake	news	(like	the	Macedonian	teens	who	targeted	content	at	Trump	supporters50)	know,	
there	is	a	near-insatiable	appetite	for	news	that	supports	our	ideological	preconceptions.	But	
it's	important	to	consider	that	people	seek	out	ideological	compatible	media	not	just	out	of	
intellectual	laziness,	but	out	of	a	sense	of	efficacy.	If	you	are	a	committed	Black	Lives	Matter	
supporter	working	on	strategies	for	citizen	review	of	the	police,	it's	exhausting	to	be	caught	in	
endless	debates	over	whether	racism	in	America	is	over.	If	you're	working	on	counseling	
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women	away	from	abortion	towards	adoption,	understanding	how	to	be	effective	in	your	own	
movement	is	likely	to	be	a	higher	priority	for	you	than	dialog	with	pro-choice	activists.	
	
Partisan	isolationism	is	not	just	purely	a	function	of	homophily.	The	structure	of	internet	media	
platforms	contributes	to	ideological	isolation.	While	Pariser51	and	others	trace	these	structural	
effects	to	Facebook	and	other	highly	targeted	social	media,	I	argued	in	Rewire52	that	three	
different	generations	of	internet	media	have	made	it	possible	to	self-select	the	topics	and	
points	of	views	we	are	most	interested	in.	The	pre-Google	web	allowed	us	to	self	select	points	
of	view	much	as	a	magazine	rack	does:	we	choose	the	National	Review	over	the	Nation,	or	their	
respective	websites.	Unlike	broadcast	media,	which	lends	itself	towards	centrist	points	of	view	
to	attract	a	wide	range	of	ad	dollars,	narrowcast	media	like	websites	and	magazines	allow	more	
stark,	partisan	divisions.	With	the	rise	of	search,	interest-based	navigation	often	led	us	to	
ideological	segregation,	either	through	the	topics	we	select	or	the	language	we	choose	to	
pursue	them	-	the	vegan	cooking	website	is	unlikely	place	to	meet	conservatives,	much	as	
searching	for	progressive	voices	on	a	hunting	site	can	be	frustrating.	And	the	language	we	use	
to	describe	an	issue	–	climate	change,	global	warming	or	scientific	fraud	–	can	be	thoroughly	
ideologically	isolating	in	terms	of	the	information	we	retrieve.	
	
What’s	different	about	social	media	is	not	that	we	can	choose	the	points	of	view	we	encounter,	
but	that	we	are	often	unaware	that	we	are	making	these	choices.	Many	people	joined	Facebook	
expecting	the	service	would	help	them	remain	connected	with	family	and	friends,	not	that	it	
would	become	a	primary	source	of	news.	As	of	2016,	62%	of	American	adults	reported	getting	
some	news	via	social	media,	and	18%	reported	often	getting	news	through	platforms	like	
Facebook.53	These	numbers	are	more	dramatic	for	young	adults,	and	likely	increased	during	the	
2016	presidential	election.	Because	Facebook’s	newsfeed	algorithm	presents	content	to	you	
based	on	content	you’ve	liked	and	clicked	on	in	the	past,	it	has	a	tendency	to	reinforce	your	
existing	preconceptions,	both	because	your	friends	are	likely	to	share	those	points	of	view,	and	
because	your	behavior	online	indicates	to	Facebook	what	content	you	are	most	interested	in.	
Eli	Pariser	calls	this	problem	“the	filter	bubble”,	building	on	earlier	work	done	by	Cass	
Sunstein54,	which	recognized	the	tendency	to	create	“echo	chambers”	online	by	selecting	
media	that	fits	our	politics.	Pariser	argues	(controversially)	that	algorithms	used	by	Facebook	
and	others	increase	this	tendency.	
	
It’s	worth	noting	that	the	filter	bubble	problem	isn’t	inherent	to	social	media.	Twitter	has	
pointedly	not	filtered	their	timeline,	which	avoids	the	filter	bubble,	but	leaves	responsibility	for	
escaping	echo	chambers	to	the	user.	While	you	can	decide	to	follow	a	different	group	of	people	
on	Twitter,	research	from	Nathan	Matias	suggests	that	even	highly	motivated	people	are	
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unlikely	to	make	major	changes	in	their	online	behavior	in	order	to	combat	biases	and	
prejudices.55	 
	
Our	team	at	the	MIT	Media	Lab	is	working	on	Gobo,	a	new	tool	that	allows	you	to	filter	your	
Facebook	and	Twitter	feeds	differently,	using	natural	language	processing	and	machine	learning	
to	build	filters	that	can	increase	or	decrease	the	political	content	of	your	news	feed,	give	you	
more	or	fewer	female	authors,	or	consciously	choose	to	encounter	more	news	outside	of	your	
echo	chamber.	One	of	the	key	questions	we	seek	to	answer	in	buiding	the	tool	is	whether	
people	will	actually	choose	to	use	these	filters.	One	hypothesis	we	hope	to	disprove	is	that,		
despite	complaining	about	filter	bubbles,	many	people	seem	to	enjoy	ideological	isolation	and	
may	choose	settings	similar	to	what	they	encounter	online	now.	
	
General	interest	media,	like	broadcast	television	and	national	newspapers,	traditionally	saw	
themselves	as	having	a	responsibility	to	provide	ideological	balance,	global	perspectives	and	
diversity	in	their	coverage.	(Whether	they	succeeded	is	another	question	–	I’ve	heard	many	
reports	from	people	of	color	that	they	felt	invisible	in	those	“good	old	days”	and	far	more	
visible	in	contemporary,	fragmented	media.)	As	that	business	model	becomes	less	viable,	
because	readers	gravitate	towards	ideologically	compatible	material,	it’s	worth	asking	whether	
platforms	like	Facebook	have	an	appetite	for	this	work.	
	
Thus	far,	the	answer	seems	to	be	no.	Facebook	has	assiduously	avoided	being	labeled	a	
publisher,	trying	to	ensure	both	an	escape	from	legal	liability	for	content	it	hosts	under	the	Safe	
Harbor	provisions	of	US	internet	law,	and	to	prevent	itself	from	being	criticized	about	exercising	
poor	editorial	judgement.	The	problems	Facebook	is	confronted	with	are	serious.	Demands	that	
the	platform	block	“fake	news”	are	challenging,	given	that	most	of	what’s	called	“fake	news”	is	
not	obviously	fraudulent.	If	Facebook	begins	blocking	platforms	like	Breitbart,	it	will	be	accused	
of	censorship	of	political	content,	and	rightly	so.		
	
One	possible	escape	for	Facebook	is	to	eliminate	algorithmic	curation	of	newsfeeds,	moving	
back	to	a	Twitter-like	world	in	which	social	media	is	a	spray	of	information	from	anyone	you’ve	
chosen	to	pay	attention	to.	Another	is	to	adopt	a	solution	like	the	one	we	are	proposing	with	
Gobo,	and	put	control	of	filters	into	the	user’s	hands.	It’s	an	open	question	whether	Facebook	
would	choose	a	path	forward	that	gives	its	users	more	control	over	their	experience	of	the	
service.	
	
In	considering	how	platforms	enable	online	discourse,	we	need	to	consider	the	idea	that	
sharing	content	is	a	form	of	civic	participation.	Part	of	our	emergent	civics	is	the	practice	of	
making	and	disseminating	media	designed	to	strengthen	ties	within	an	identity	group	and	to	
distinguish	that	group	from	groups	that	oppose	it.	Consider	the	meme-makers	competing	for	
$20,000	from	Infowars.	Many	involved	don't	believe	that	CNN	is	ISIS,	as	one	popular	meme	
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alleges56	-	as	Judith	Donath	explains,	"News	is	shared	not	just	to	inform	or	even	to	persuade.	It	
is	used	as	a	marker	of	identity,	a	way	to	proclaim	your	affinity	with	a	particular	community."57			
	
Donath's	insight	helps	explain	why	factchecking,	blocking	fake	news	or	urging	people	to	support	
diverse,	fact-based	news	is	unlikely	to	check	the	spread	of	highly	partisan	news.	Not	only	is	
partisan	news	comfortable	and	enjoyable	(I	find	it	reassuring	to	watch	Trevor	Noah	or	
Samantha	Bee	and	assume	that	friends	on	the	right	feel	the	same	watching	Fox	News	
commentators),	spreading	this	information	has	powerful	social	rewards	and	gives	a	sense	of	
shared	efficacy,	the	feeling	(real	or	imagined)	that	you	are	making	norms-based	social	change	
by	shaping	the	information	environment.	
	
The	research	Benkler,	I	and	our	team	conducted	shows	how	rapidly	these	partisan	ecosystems	
can	come	into	being.	Examining	1.25	million	media	stories	and	25,000	media	sources,	we	gave	
each	media	source	a	partisanship	score	based	on	whether	people	who	shared	tweets	from	the	
Democratic	or	Republican	candidates	also	shared	a	story	from	a	source.	Stories	from	the	New	
York	Times	were	more	often	shared	by	people	who’d	retweeted	Hillary	Clinton	than	those	
who’d	retweeted	Donald	Trump,	but	the	effect	was	much	more	pronounced	with	Breitbart:	
Breitbart	was	amplified	almost	exclusively	by	Trump	supporters.	Our	research	shows	a	tightly	
clustered	set	of	sites	read	only	by	the	nationalist	right.	The	vast	majority	of	these	sites	are	very	
new,	most	founded	during	the	Obama	administration.	This	community	of	interest	has	very	little	
overlap	with	traditional	conservative	sources	like	the	Wall	Street	Journal	or	the	National	
Review.	In	our	study,	those	publications	are	both	low	in	influence	and	linked	to	by	both	the	left	
and	right,	while	the	Breitbart-centered	cluster	functions	as	an	echo	chamber.	
	
The	emergence	of	echo	chambers	like	the	one	around	Breitbart	further	complicates	fact-
checking.	danah	boyd	explains	that	in	teaching	students	not	to	rely	on	Wikipedia,	we’ve	
encouraged	them	to	triangulate	their	way	to	truth	from	Google	search	results.58	On	topics	
covered	heavily	in	the	Breitbartosphere	but	not	addressed	in	the	broader	media	universe,	this	
leads	to	a	perverse	effect.	Search	for	information	on	Pizzagate	as	the	story	was	being	
developed	on	sites	like	Infowars	and	you	would	likely	find	links	to	other	far-right	sites	
promoting	the	story.	By	the	time	sites	like	the	New	York	Times	became	aware	of	the	story	and	
began	debunking	it,	many	interested	in	the	faux-scandal	had	persuaded	themselves	of	its	truth	
through	repetition	within	a	subset	of	closely	related	websites,	to	the	point	where	an	unstable	
individual	took	up	arms	to	“self-investigate”	the	controversy.59	
	
Hallin’s	spheres	suggests	we	question	whether	we	are	encouraged	to	discuss	a	wide	enough	
range	of	topics	within	the	sphere	of	legitimate	controversy.	The	problem	we	face	now	is	one	in	
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which	dialog	is	challenging,	if	not	impossible,	because	one	party’s	sphere	of	consensus	is	the	
other’s	sphere	of	deviance	and	vice	versa.	Our	debates	are	complicated	not	only	because	we	
cannot	agree	on	a	set	of	shared	facts,	but	because	we	cannot	agree	what’s	worth	talking	about	
in	the	first	place.	When	one	camp	sees	Hillary	Clinton’s	controversial	email	server	as	evidence	
of	her	lawbreaking	and	deviance	(sphere	of	consensus	for	many	on	the	right)	or	as	a	needless	
distraction	from	more	relevant	issues	(sphere	of	deviance	for	many	on	the	left),	we	cannot	
agree	to	disagree,	as	we	cannot	agree	that	the	conversation	is	worth	having	in	the	first	place.	
	
Much	as	there	is	no	obvious,	easy	solution	to	countering	mistrust	in	institutions,	I	have	no	
panaceas	for	polarization	and	echo	chambers.	Still,	it’s	worth	identifying	these	phenomena	–	
and	acknowledging	their	deep	roots	–	as	we	seek	solutions	to	these	pressing	problems.	It	is	
worth	noting	that	the	research	Benkler’s	and	my	team	carried	out	suggests	the	phenomenon	of	
asymmetric	polarization	–	in	our	analysis,	those	on	the	far	right	are	more	isolated	in	terms	of	
viewpoints	they	encounter	than	those	on	the	far	left.	There’s	nothing	in	our	research	that	
suggests	the	right	is	inherently	more	prone	to	ideological	isolation.	By	understanding	how	
extreme	polarization	has	developed	recently,	it	might	be	possible	to	stop	the	left	from	
developing	a	similar	echo	chamber.	Our	research	also	suggests	that	the	center	right	has	a	
productive	role	to	play	in	building	media	that	appeals	to	an	insurrectionist	and	alienated	right-
leading	audience,	which	keeps	those	important	viewpoints	in	dialog	with	existing	communities	
in	the	left,	center	and	right.	
	
Fundamentally,	I	believe	that	the	polarization	of	dialog	in	the	media	is	a	result	both	of	new	
media	technologies	and	of	the	deeper	changes	of	trust	in	institutions	and	in	how	civics	is	
practiced.	The	Breitbartosphere	is	possible	not	just	because	it’s	easier	than	ever	to	create	a	
media	outlet	and	share	viewpoints	with	the	like-minded.	It’s	possible	because	low	trust	in	
government	leads	people	to	seek	new	ways	of	being	engaged	and	effective,	and	low	trust	in	
media	leads	people	to	seek	out	different	sources.	Making	and	disseminating	media	feels	like	
one	of	the	most	effective	ways	to	engage	in	civics	in	a	low-trust	world,	and	the	2016	elections	
suggest	that	this	civic	media	is	a	powerful	force	we	are	only	now	starting	to	understand.	
	
	
Closing	questions	
	
I	want	to	acknowledge	that	this	paper	may	stray	far	from	the	immediate	challenges	that	face	us	
around	issues	of	information	quality,	in	the	service	of	seeking	for	their	deeper	roots.	My	
questions	follow	in	the	same	spirit.	For	the	most	part,	these	are	questions	to	which	I	don’t	have	
a	good	answer.	Some	are	active	research	questions	for	my	lab.	My	fear	is	that	we	may	have	to	
address	some	of	these	underlying	questions	before	tackling	tactical	questions	of	how	we	should	
best	respond	to	immediate	challenges	to	faith	in	journalism.	
	
	
	
Trust:	
- How	long	does	it	take	to	recover	trust	in	an	institution	that	has	failed?	What	are	
examples	of	a	mistrusted	institution	regaining	public	trust?	
- Is	the	fall	in	institutional	trust	an	independent	or	a	joint	phenomenon	–	i.e.,	does	losing	
trust	in	Congress	lessen	our	trust	in	the	Supreme	Court	or	the	medical	system	
- Is	trust	in	news	media	higher	or	lower	in	countries	with	strong	public/taxpayer	
supported	media?	Does	trust	correlate	positively	or	negatively	to	ad	support?	Privacy-
invading	tracking	and	targeting?	
- If	people	don’t	trust	institutions,	who	or	what	do	they	trust?	How	do	those	patterns	
differ	for	more	trusting	elites	and	for	the	broader	population?		
	
Participation:	
- What	forms	of	participation	(from	the	traditional,	like	voting,	to	the	non-traditional,	like	
making	CNN-bashing	memes)	are	indicators	of	future	civic	engagement?	Should	we	be	
encouraging	and	celebrating	a	broader	range	of	civic	participation	amongst	youth?	
Amongst	groups	that	see	themselves	alienated	from	conventional	politics?	
- Should	media	attempt	to	explain	and	engage	audiences	more	deeply	in	institutional	
politics?	Will	acknowledging	the	limits	of	existing	institutional	politics	restore	trust	in	
journalism,	or	damage	trust	in	government?	
- Should	media	celebrate	and	promote	new	forms	of	civic	engagement?	Will	this	further	
decrease	trust	in	institutions?	Increase	a	sense	of	citizen	efficacy?	
- What	would	media	designed	for	increased	public	participation	look	like?	Are	there	
models	in	the	advocacy	journalism	space,	or	in	solutions	journalism,	constructive	
journalism	or	other	movements?	
	
Polarization:	
- Is	it	reasonable	to	expect	Americans	to	rely	on	a	single,	or	small	set,	of	professional	
media	sources	that	report	a	relatively	value-neutral	set	of	stories?	Or	is	this	goal	of	
journalistic	non-partisanship	no	longer	a	realistic	ideal?	
- Could	taxpayer-sponsored	media	serve	a	function	of	anchoring	discourse	around	a	
single	set	of	facts?	Or	will	public	media	be	inherently	untrustworthy	to	some	portion	of	
American	voters?	Why	does	public	media	seem	to	work	well	in	other	low-trust	nations	
but	not	in	the	US?	
- Is	there	a	role	for	high-quality,	factual	but	partisan	media	that	might	reach	audiences	
alienated	from	mainstream	media?	
- Should	media	outlets	learn	from	what’s	consensus,	debatable	and	deviant	in	other	
media	spheres	and	modify	coverage	to	intersect	with	reader’s	spheres?	Is	shifting	the	
boundaries	of	these	spheres	part	of	how	civics	is	conducted	today?	
	
	
	
	
	
	
